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THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES 
OF THE “WOMEN & MEN 40”
PENSION SCHEME CONCEPT IN PAY-AS-YOU-GO 
PENSION SYSTEMS
Péter Mihályi – László Vincze
ABSTRACT
With the help of ﬁ ve models, this paper analyses pension systems in general and 
the direct ﬁ nancial eﬀ ects of the retirement-age-reducing concept mentioned in 
the title. Th e ﬁ rst part assumes a ﬁ nancially unchanged environment, when earn-
ings are permanent, there is no interest and everyone lives for a predetermined 
length of time (deterministic models). Taking into consideration actual mortality 
rates (stochastic model) we give an idealised description of the current pay-as-
you-go pension system, which, however, does not signiﬁ cantly diﬀ er from real 
life. Th e most important consequence of taking mortality into consideration is 
the life insurance eff ect. Th e contribution of individuals who deceased prior to 
reaching a pensionable age, will increase the sources for the pension of survivors. 
Every forint the survivors paid themselves is worth 1.5–2 times as much on ac-
count of this life-insurance eﬀ ect.
In the second part of the paper incomes are assumed to increase and interest 
also accounted for. Here we highlight the advantage of funded pension schemes 
in that for the same amount of pension they require a third to half of the pen-
sion insurance contributions of the pay-as-you-go pension system, because half 
to two-thirds of pension funding comes from the returns on invested payments. 
Analysis of this reveals the hidden state deﬁ cit inherent in the pay-as-you-go pen-
sion scheme, and the fact that every active employee pays the interests on it on a 
monthly basis when paying two to three times more in pension insurance contri-
bution than would be necessary.
Th e third part demonstrates that if both women and men were to retire aft er 40 
years of employment, it would entail pensions cuts of 9–12 for females and males 
respectively or a general pension cut of 19 for both sexes on average, if the pre-
sent balance of contributions and pension payments are to be kept in the future. 
JEL codes: C88, H55, G22
Keywords: pension system, early retirement at 40, modelling the pay-as-you-go 
pension system
PÉTER MIHÁLYI – LÁSZLÓ VINCZE4
INTRODUCTION
It is well known that the amendment of the Pension Act1 that entered into force 
in January 2011 is called “Women 40 programme” for short. What it stands for 
is that regardless of age, a woman who has acquired 40 years of “eligibility,” as 
deﬁ ned by Hungarian legislation, is entitled to retire with a full pension even if 
she is still below the statutory retirement age. According to the provisions of the 
Pension Act, the main diﬀ erence between the calculation of “service period” and 
“eligibility period” is that the latter can include neither the time spent in tertiary 
education nor any period of time where the individual paid all her contributions 
but did not draw a salary. As a consequence of these speciﬁ c regulations, the 
“Women 40 programme” chieﬂ y beneﬁ ts women under the age of 63 (the present 
number for retirement age for women) who have worked from the age 18, never 
obtained a college/university degree and were never (or were rarely) unemployed. 
Th e demand for the only early retirement possibility granted by law exceeded 
the government’s expectations, and to date some 123 thousand women retired on 
these grounds.2 In this paper “Men 40 programme” will refer to the idea of grant-
ing men a similar beneﬁ t. It is obvious without proof or analysis that these pro-
grammes (would) increase pension costs while at the same time reducing pension 
contribution revenues. 
Th ese changes are clearly at odds with the European Union’s general strategy and 
the re-orientation strategies decided on by numerous Members States, which fo-
cuses on delaying the retirement age.3 On the other hand, however, it should be 
noted that the programme(s) in question are “exceptional” in Hungary’s case, 
since Hungary complied with EU legislation by introducing in 2012, as a main 
principle, the prohibition of retirement before reaching the pensionable age.4 Th e 
purpose of this paper is to quantify the combined eﬀ ects of these two “special” 
programmes with respect to the replacement rates (to be deﬁ ned later).
Th e models to be used in the present paper are simpliﬁ ed models, but even these 
models allow for the presentation of the salient features of the Hungarian pay-
as-you-go pension system and for the quantiﬁ cation of a number of correlations 
that oft en escape the attention of the economists with a basic knowledge of mac-
roeconomics.
Th e following conditions were considered to be generally valid:
1  Act 81(18)(2a) – (2d) of 1997
2  Farkas (2015).
3  Ebbinghaus – Hofäcker (2015); Gomez-Leon et al. (2015); Bönke et al. (2015)
4  For the ﬁ rst controversies of the Hungarian solution, see Simonovits (2015).
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1. It is assumed that everybody starts work at the age of L = 21. Th at approxi-
mates the average 18–25 age of entering work; also, the choice of L corre-
sponds to the age of entering work following the obtaining of a bachelor-level 
degree.5
2. Wages (W) will be considered to be the super-gross amount (the sum of an 
employee’s gross wage plus social and health insurance) which an active per-
son costs his or her employer. All tax and contribution rates will apply to 
this amount, thus excluding the complicating fact that a portion of pension 
contributions is paid by the employer.6
3. All amounts remaining aft er taxes, other contributions and pension savings 
and/or contributions, are assumed to be spent, that is, there are no other sav-
ings.
4. Th e only pension considered in this paper is old-age pension. Like the experts 
of the Round Table of Pension Old Age7, this paper shall not be concerned 
with disability, orphans’ and widowers’ pension either. 
5. Th e ﬁ nancial balance of the pension sector is taken for granted, that is, it 
is assumed that if women had not been allowed to retire aft er 40 years of 
employment and the same is not granted to men, the pension contributions 
equal the pension paid by the state.8 
6. Our models do not account for the absolute size of wage; consequently, the 
question does not come up whether an earnings-related pension will provide 
a suﬃ  cient income in a beneﬁ ciary’s old age in comparison with subsistence 
indices.
7. Th is paper does not account for the operative (administrative) costs of the 
pension system, which constitute a mere 0.8 of pension payments.
5 In these parameters we have adopted the system employed András Simonovits (2002; 2015).
6 Put this way is a simpliﬁ cation of the legal situation because the 24 pension contribution of an 
employer is now part of the social contribution tax which, Hungarian legislation provides, has to 
be considered to be a “contribution to the costs of common social needs” and no longer needs to be 
spent exclusively on pension payments. Th ese feature in the tables of the Budget Act jointly, under 
the name of “portion of the social contribution tax belonging to the Pension Fund and employers’ 
pension insurance contribution”. Exactly how much of it “belongs to” to Pension Fund is decided on 
an annual basis by Parliament. Calculated in contribution points, the pension payments by the Fund 
amounted to less than a third of employers’ pension contributions. Quantiﬁ ed, this means that 10/
(10+24) = 29.4. Th e proportions are similar on the basis of the 2015 budget.
7 Holtzer (2010)
8 While that might not be true, it will help shed light on the eﬀ ect of the two programmes on the 
pension system, ceteris paribus.
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1. A FINANCIALLY UNCHANGED ENVIRONMENT:
PERMANENT EARNINGS, NO INTEREST AND NO RETURNS
Part 1 will simplistically assume that there is no inﬂ ation; wages, consumption 
and interests are permanent each year, and the average proﬁ t rate characteristic 
of the entire economy is zero.
1.1 Deterministic models
Th ese models are called deterministic because they assume everyone lives to a 
given age. In the ﬁ rst model it will be assumed that a person
a) lives to the age of D = 80;
b) year R will be the last full year that person will have worked;
c) this person was never unemployed during his/her active period;
d) he/she paid taxes and contributions on his/her real wages;
e) he/she never undertook grey or black labour.9
Th e choice of the D = 80 age allows for a simple, easy-to-interpret life path. If a 
person worked to the age of 60 (R = 60) the proportion of active and inactive years 
will be exactly A/N = 2:1. 
1.1.1 Individual precautionary savings – self-fi nanced pension
First, the eﬀ ect of the pensionable age (R) will be examined, being as it is, the only 
independent variable. In this case, R is a pre-planned value, where the rate of sav-
ings is adjusted to entire active period of the individual’s life. Th e individual can 
only count on his/herself by saving up during their active years for the time when 
he or she no longer wishes to work. Th eir private pension will obviously be earn-
ings related, and will serve to maintain the same consumption rate in their pen-
sion (N) years as during their active (A) years, that is to achieve a replacement rate 
(r) of 100.10 Th e individual will put aside s per cent of W wage, will pay a taxes 
9  One of the greatest problems of the current Hungarian pension system is that conditions [(III, IV, 
V3., 4., 5.] are not even close to being met  (see Augusztinovics  2005; Augusztinovics  – Köll 
2007.
10  Th e replacement rate is the rate of self-ﬁ nanced precautionary pension or the “normal” pension 
and the net incomes of active years. Its signiﬁ cance is that it shows the extent of pension services 
compared to last year’s net incomes.  In Hungary this rate – as calculated by the standard OECD 
methodology – was 95 in 2012, that is, not much below 100. Th e mandatory state system in Japan 
and the United Kingdom provides a 41 and 42 replacement rate, respectively (see https://data.
oecd.org/pension/net-pension-replacement-rates.htm, downloaded: 22.11.2015). Th at is possible be-
cause in these two countries – and in developed market economies in general – the elderly popula-
tion have considerable ﬁ nancial savings, while the same cannot be said for Hungary where, as it is 
well known, old-age savings are more the exception.
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in the form of income tax, health insurance, etc. and consume the remaining W 
(1 – a – s) amount. Consumption during the inactive years (N = D – R) equals the 
savings of the active years (A = R + 1 – L), so it can be established that
(D – R) × W × (1 – a – s) = (R + 1 – L) × W × s  (1)
Rearrangement of equation (1) yields
 (2)
Assuming taxation charges on personal incomes to be a = 2511, the values of 
A/N and s can be seen as a function of R in Figure 1. Th e basic case is this: L = 21, 
R = 60, D = 80, length of active age: 40; inactive age: 20 years.
Figure 1
Necessary rate of savings (s) and A/N as a function of planned R,
with a certain life expectancy of 80
Fi gure 1 shows the rate of savings (s) for given periods of active years. When the 
active period is shorter, a larger rate of savings is required to maintain the same 
level of consumption in a person’s inactive age as in their active period. However, 
the larger rate of savings merely reﬂ ects the main disadvantage: where the active 
period is shorter, due to lower life earnings, consumption will be lower through-
out that person’s whole life than would be possible with a longer planned active 
11  Average data for Hungary – according to Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃ  ce – correspond to 
this in 2015.
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age. Taking this into consideration, a speciﬁ c goal can be determined, namely 
if a person wishes their consumption to reach at least 50 per cent of their previ-
ous working income, they need to work at least to the age of 60 and the earliest 
point of retirement is age 61. Th is will correspond to the selected basic case where 
A/N = 2.0. Figure 2 shows how, during a person’s 40 active years, half of the earn-
ings go to consumption and a quarter to savings, which will ultimately cover an 
unchanged level of consumption in the following 20 inactive years.
In other words, with the given parameters, a person’s consumption will be sta-
tionary regardless of whether he/she is pensioned or working. Th e very simplicity 
of this model makes it strikingly clear how a person can consume as much as their 
life earnings aft er tax. Precautionary savings and using up those savings only 
means regrouping in time.
Since changing the retirement age alters both the length of active and inactive 
years, the rate of necessary savings is sensitive to the planned length of a person’s 
active age. Figure 1 shows that a 5 reduction in the active age (R reduces from 
60 to 58, making the active age 38 instead of 40) entails a 2.5 percentage point 
increase in necessary savings (from 25.0 to 27.5) which corresponds to a 10 
increase in savings.
Figure 2
Rates of taxes, savings, consumption and payments in inactive age
Note: Basic case L = 21, R = 60, D = 80, active age 40 years, inactive age 20 years.
Th e model demonstrates the consequence of the unplanned shortening of the ac-
tive period, the smaller pension. If a person spent 50 of the active-age income on 
consumption (that is 25 of earnings was put aside for pension), but later changes 
his/her mind or falls ill and decides to retire prior to the age of 61, the replace-
ment rate will inevitably fall. Equation (1) therefore needs to be complemented, 
W super 
gross 
earnings 
PIT + contribution 
25% of super gross wages  
Savings  
25% of super gross wages  
 
In line with condition 3. 
Consumption = Net earnings 
50% of super gross wages  
 
Active age 40 years  
Pay out 
50% of 
super gross 
wages  
 
Inactive age 
20 years  
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because the equality of old-age consumption and active-age savings is guaranteed 
by alteration of the replacement rate for the given pension contribution (s) cor-
responding to the planned length of active age:
h × N × W × (1 – a – s) = A × W × s (3)
Expressing the replacement rate:
 (4)
Th e results are summed up in Figure 3. If an individual works until the age of 58.5 
instead of the planned 60, the replacement rate will be 89.5, that is, the old-age 
consumption will reduce by 10.5. I.e. the individual will have that much less 
money to spend compared to their active-age net income.
Th e precautionary self-retirement model might at ﬁ rst seem unrealistic. How-
ever, this model can be also interpreted as a voluntary, supplementary insurance 
scheme. Th is already exists in most countries in the world, including Hungary 
(personal pensions or contributory/voluntary savings constitute the so-called 
3rd Pillar in the World Bank Pension Conceptual Framework), and it will almost 
certainly be necessary in the future. At the same time, the ﬁ gures above reveal 
what large amount of savings a person would have to make during their active 
period, if the aim is to provide for the old-age pension exclusively or almost en-
tirely from voluntary savings such as these (as opposed to a mandatory, pooled 
pension system, where a 10–20 rate of savings would suﬃ  ce). 
Figure 3
Replacement rate (h) in the case of an unplanned change of R
R (year)
Nsa
Ash
 ×)1(
 ×

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1.2 Precautionary savings at the population level –
a pension system model with life expectancies
Th e model used in this section already constitutes a real-life pension system, be-
cause individual savings are required to be paid into a pension fund; the rate 
of savings is determined by law; and by deﬁ nition it covers a larger populace. 
Th e savings here correspond to a pension contribution (hereinaft er contribution) 
which, in the majority of developed countries, are levied by the state and distrib-
uted by the state as pension.12 Th e size of the pool allows for consideration of the 
fact that members of various generations retire at diﬀ erent ages. Equations (2) and 
(4) remain valid, but the meaning of A and N will be diﬀ erent. Rather than sig-
nifying the number of active and pension years of an individual, they will denote 
the number of active and pensioned individuals. Consequently, the model can 
reﬂ ect the eﬀ ect of other factors, such as members of various generations starting 
work and retiring at diﬀ erent times.
In the second version of the model, we select data that closer approach real values 
in Hungary. Th e data come partly from statistical reports, and are partly estima-
tions. Because the purpose of the inquiry is to calculate, ceteris paribus, the eﬀ ect 
of introducing the Women 40 and the Men 40 programmes on the replacement 
rate, a good approximation will suﬃ  ce.
Th is model is also deterministic. At the age of 62 everybody has the same aver-
age life expectancy, that is, 77 for men and 82 for women.13 R + 1 = 63, an age that 
people born in 1952 will have reached in 2015, and is the retirement age for people 
born in 1953. Th e replacement rate will be assumed to be the statistical 95 with 
women’s earnings being 86 of men’s.14
First, we calculate the contribution rate corresponding to the ﬁ nancial equilib-
rium separately for men and women, and then jointly for both.
1.2.1 Contribution rate (s) for men only
Equation (3) with male data is as follows:
WM × s × A = h × WM × (1 – a– s) × N, (5)
where A = (R – L + 1) × l and N = (D – R) ×  l. Th e number of living members of 
the cohort in its tth year is l(t), and in this model it is considered to be the same in 
every year, that is, it can be considered to be l. Consequently,
12  Th e fact that being part of the pension system is mandatory has no role in this model.
13  Mária Hablicsekné Richter (2011).
14  Farkas (2015).
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s × A = h × (1 – a) × N – h × s × N (6)
Rearranged for s:
 (7)
Using the data (A = 42 ×  l, N = 14 × l) yields sM = 18.0.
1.2.2 Contribution rate (s) for women only
Using the corresponding ﬁ gure (A = 42 × l, N = 19 × l) for equation (7) yields 
sW=22.5.
1.2.3. Contribution rate (s) for the entire population
Altering equation (5) for both sexes:
WM× s × A × (1 + 0.86) = h × WM× (1 – a – s) × (NM+ 0.86 × NW) (8)
Aft er simpliﬁ cation and rearrangement:
s × [h × (NM + 0.86 × NW) + 1.86 × A] = h × (1 – a) × (NM + 0.86 × NW) (9)
From equation (9), the contribution rate can be calculated by means of an equa-
tion not unlike (7):
 (10)
Replacing the adequate data in equation (10) yields s=20.2% for the entire popula-
tion.
It can be established from the above that if every Hungarian working man and 
woman were to work continuously throughout their careers, and were to achieve 
the average life expectancy, women and men would have to pay a contribution 
rate of about 22 and 18 per cent, respectively. 
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1.3 Th e stochastic model, gradual mortality 
1.3.1 Life insurance eff ect 
In contrast with sections 1.1 and 1.2 where death was assumed to occur at speciﬁ c 
times (the age of 80, 77 and 82), this model will account for the gradual occur-
rence of death. Figure 4 shows the mortality curve – which one might call, more 
optimistically, survival curve – which reveals for every year how many of a hun-
dred thousand people born in the same year are still alive.
Figure 4
Mortality curve
Th e above ﬁ gure clearly reveals the following logical consequences:
 • Th e number of people in each cohort is not constant, but decreases from one 
year to the other;
 • Not every member of a population born in the same year pays contributions; 
consequently total contributions at a given rate will be somewhat lower than 
as if everyone were to live to retirement age. Th e contribution rate is just 89% 
for the 21–60 age group.
 • Only a portion – 40–70% – of a given cohort will live up to retirement age and 
take out pension payments.15 Due to the age groups of diminishing numbers, 
the sum total of pension payments is, for 61–100 years, only 50% of the total 
pension of the 20 age groups (aged 61–80) consisting of full numbers.
15  It might be low by EU comparison, it is an important fact that positive changes can be observed 
in Hungary for life expectancy not only at birth, but also at 60 (Monostori, 2015).
l(t) (number of living members)
t (age)
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Th ere are, however, further non-trivial consequences of the above simplistic as-
sumptions:
 • Th e necessary pension contribution cannot be calculated for a determined life 
expectancy;
 • Deciding what to do with the contributions of people who do not live to take 
out pension payments depends on the choice of model. Th e solution used by 
systems built on the logic of social security is that the contributions of deceased 
people go to the survivors. Th is makes pension insurance an entitlement-type 
life insurance scheme and accordingly, it provides extra services compared to 
private pension in that every forint of survivors’ contributions will be worth 
considerably more than the contributions of people who decease prior to their 
life expectancy.16
Calculating the actual values is a more complex task than the previous ones. 
Equation (2) works here too, but the A/N parameter can only be calculated by 
means of the following deﬁ nite integral formula (11):
 (11)
Because demographical data are usually provided annually, the integrals are re-
placed by the sum of annual data, which makes the formula used for the calcula-
tions the following:
 (12)
Due to gradual mortality the diﬀ erence is that due to more favourable A/N values 
the necessary contribution rate is smaller for each R than in the deterministic 
and individual model in I/1. Th e results are summed up and compared in Figure 
5 below.
16  Th e general public are completely unaware of this similarity, even though the relatively familiar 
Hungarian personal income tax rules treat pension insurance payments as such (Banyár et al., 
2014).
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Figure 5
Proportion of active/pensioned years (A/N) and the necessary rate of savings (s)
as a function of R for the deterministic (1) and stochastic (2) model
In the stochastic model, the contribution rate is lower and its value more sen-
sitive to the length of a person’s active age than in the deterministic model. 
Figure 5 reveals that a reduction of a person’s active age by 5 (R reduces from 60 
to 58 years, and the active years will be 38 instead of 40) entails a 2.2 percentage 
point increase in savings (15.3 to 17.5) and means a 14.3 increase in savings. 
Naturally that is only true for people who live to retirement age. At the same time, 
the survivors’ contributions are increased by the contributions of the deceased, 
which means that their every forint in contributions will be worth 1.5–2 forints17 
when they receive pension. How much more the insured person will receive also 
depends on how much longer they live than the average life expectancy typical 
of their sex.
However, if a person dies before retirement age, the majority of their contribu-
tions will be lost to their spouse and heirs. If a person dies a few years aft er retir-
ing, the person will take out a smaller amount of pension than the present value 
of their contributions. Th is diﬀ erence cannot be inherited either.18
In sum, the current pension system is a form of insurance that pools pension 
contributors into a risk community. Under this system, only persons living to 
retirement and achieving their statistical life expectancy will break even. Persons 
17  Naturally instead of HUF we might have written USD or EUR.
18  In actual fact in most countries the spouse or partner of the deceased can be granted a widower’s 
pension, whose value, however, is a mere 20–30 of the old-age pension the deceased would have 
received. Th is is not dealt with in this paper
s1
s2
A/N1
A/N2
A/N
THE FINANCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE “WOMEN & MEN 40” PENSION SCHEME 15
living longer proﬁ t from the system, while people dying before the retirement age 
lose out. Th is is the price of having the security of a pension till death. It should be 
noted, however, that this is still far removed from reality. Th is model
 • assumes that an equal number of people are born in every year, meaning that 
it is irrelevant whether the pension system is pay-as-you-go or funded; and
 • does not account for inﬂ ation, interest, or proﬁ ts; the present value of 
contributions and pension payments is independent from the time/date and 
corresponds to the nominal value. 
1.4 Calculations based on real demographical data
First we establish the actual numbers for each age group [l(t)]. Figure 6 shows 
demographical data for 2015. Th e number of active and pensioned individuals is 
given in the numerator and denominator of equation (12).
Unemployment and the fact that part of active individuals work in the grey or 
black economy (and consequently pay less or no contribution) will be taken into 
account. Unemployment rate will be taken to be 1019 and unpaid contributions 
(due to grey and black-market work) will be accounted for by further reducing the 
rate of contributors by 15. Because the volume of the grey and black economy is 
an estimated HUF 5,000 billion, that is, one sixth of the GDP, 15 is a good ap-
proximation: A* = (1 – 0.10 – 0.15) ×  A = 0.75 × A.
Because the numbers of women and men are never the same, not even during the 
active age, equation (10) will be altered as follows:
 (13)
Th e resulting contribution rate for the entire population (18.6) does not signiﬁ -
cantly diﬀ er from the 20.2 in model I/2. However, aft er considering the ex-
istence of unemployment and the contribution shortfall due to the grey and 
black economies, the necessary contribution rate further increases from 18.6 
to 22.9%.
19  If public workers are considered to be unemployed (as many theoretical economists will argue), 
this largely corresponds to the current situation.
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Figure 6
Population data by single-year age for 2015
Source: Website of the Hungarian Central Statistical Oﬃ  ce (2015), dates in table; the above ﬁ gure is 
by the authors.
2. FINANCIALLY CHANGING ENVIRONMENT
THAT ACCOUNTS FOR INCOME RISES AND RETURNS
In Part 2 we introduce two new conditions: (1) saved and invested capital has re-
turns (r) larger than zero; (2) incomes can increase. Th is inquiry will be limited to 
the eﬀ ect of returns and gradual mortality.
2.1. Deterministic model, self-fi nanced pension
2.1.1 Permanent income and changing returns
Due to the presence of returns, the present value of both savings and pension pay-
ments (i.e. the monetary value of pension in retirement age) can be calculated as 
an annuity. Th e present value of savings at the time of birth20 is as follows:
20  Th is was chosen because it is a well-deﬁ ned point of reference that does not depend on any-
thing else.
number
(person)
Men
Women
Age (years)
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 (14)
Th e present value of pension payments at the time of birth:
 (15)
Expressing s from the equality of the two present-value equations yields
 (16)
Th e results as a function of R and r are summed up in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Pension contribution (s) and A/N as a function of R
with a life span of 80 years
Leading to an increase in capital, the reinvestment of returns considerably 
reduces the volume of required pension contributions:  for returns of 3, con-
tributions reduce by half; and for returns of 5 to a third or a quarter. Th is also 
increases the amount of money that can be spent on consumption in both active 
and pension years. In the case of self-ﬁ nanced pension aft er the age of 60, con-
sumption will be not be 50 of one’s income, but 62 for returns of 3, and 68 
for returns of 5; meaning a 24 and 36 increase in living standards respec-
tively.
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Naturally, to achieve this result, it is necessary to make investments, that is, to 
deposit contributions. At returns of 3, the total amount of capital ﬁ nancing the 
pension contribution will be 9.66 times the annual income and at 5 8.93 times. 
Th e larger the returns the smaller amount of capital is necessary for the payment 
of the same pension. However, returns have a greater eﬀ ect than obvious at ﬁ rst 
sight. Th e capital stock ﬁ nancing pensions in year R will be one’s own savings; if 
there are no returns, it will be 10 times one’s annual income (100 of the capital), 
at returns of 3 5.12 times (53 of the capital), and at 5 just 2.96 times (33 
of the capital). In other words, following the reinvestment of returns compound 
interests double or more than triple the original capital. Consequently, pension 
savings are not only “processed” through the system, but also, thanks to capital 
market investments and bank loans, they contribute capital to the economy. A 
share of the proﬁ ts of ﬁ nanced enterprises and the interests on bank-deposit loans 
create a source of growth of the capital that constitutes the basis of pensions. It is 
based on the growth of the economy and returns are the results therein.
2.1.2 Growing income and varying returns
Let returns continue to be r, let the annual rate of growth of incomes be g and let 
r > g. Th e present value of savings and pension payments can still be calculated as 
an annuity, but contributions are not permanent but are growing. Th e present val-
ue of growing savings – like growing annuities – at the time of birth is as follows21:
 (17)
Th e present value of pension payments at the time of birth:
 (18)
Equations (17) and (18) diﬀ er from (14) and (15) only in that they contain W1/(r–g) 
instead of W/r. Due to the fact that in the course of setting up and arranging the 
resultant equation these factors drop out, the dependency of pension contribu-
tions on R and r is not aﬀ ected by whether the income is permanent or growing, 
assuming that the returns exceed the rate of growth of incomes. For this case too 
the dependency of pension contributions on R and r is shown in equation (16) and 
Figure 7.
21  Illés (1998)
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2.2 Stochastic model
2.2.1 Funded pension
Th is model diﬀ ers from 1.3 in that it is funded: savings are deposited on private 
accounts where the returns are reinvested until retirement and this accumulated 
capital (which continues to make returns) covers a person’s pension. It has been 
shown how (for fortunate survivors, at least) contribution rates are reduced by 
actual mortality (1.3) and interests in the determined model (2.1). Actual mortality 
and returns together will further reduce necessary contributions.
Th is model cannot be described by a closed formula, because there are too many 
parameters changing from year to year, including the number of people in an 
age group, pension contributions and pension payments, as well as the volume 
of the pension fund that generates returns. Th e average income of the age groups 
also changes (albeit it has not been accounted for here) partly because of inﬂ ation 
matching and partly because of career progression.
In calculating this model it will only be assumed that the ﬁ nancial balance is 
correct for the individual age groups only. In other words, consisting of contribu-
tions of the members of the examined age group and aggregated with returns, the 
pension fund will be exhausted by pension payments when the last member of 
the age group deceases statistically. We are looking for the s contribution rate for 
which this holds true.
If every member of an age group begins work at the age of L and retires at the age 
of R + 1, the accumulation of T pension fund of the age group for R years can be 
expressed by means of the following series of recursive formulae:
T(L)=W(L)× s × l(L) (19)
T(L+1) = T (L) × (1 + r) + W(L + 1) × s × l (L + 1) (20)
 (21)
 (22)
T(R) can be expressed by means of a closed formulae, as follows: 
 (23)
but it is more appropriate to use a series of recursive formulae, because it works 
better in an Excel chart and the use of the pension fund can subsequently calcu-
lated by means of a recursive formula:
 )()()1()1()( tlstWrtTtT 
 )()()1()1()( RlsRWrRTRT 

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 (24)
 (25)
 (26)
Next, we need to ﬁ nd the s rate of savings for which the value of formula (26) will 
be zero; when the age group dies out – that is, l(t) reduces to zero – and T(t), i.e. 
its pension fund capital equals zero. Owing to the use of the series of recursive 
formulae, this model works for both permanent and varying incomes.
Th e results are summed up in Figure 8. Th e necessary pension contribution rate 
reduces signiﬁ cantly, and returns of 3 produce similar results as 5 returns in 
the deterministic model (cf. Table 1.).22 In ﬁ nancial terms, this two percentage 
point diﬀ erence means that the internal rate of return of the demographical eﬀ ect 
of gradual mortality is 2.
Figure 8
Necessary pension contribution (s) as a function of R
in the deterministic and stochastic model
22  Another thought: in the pay-as-you-go system as we know it there is an implicit public debt ele-
ment which, if the state decided overnight to swift  to a funded pension system, would instantly be-
come explicit. Just because a debt is implicit it still exists as a debt, and every active earner is paying 
back that debt by paying at least twice as much in pension contribution in the pay-as-you-go system 
as they would have to in the funded system with a real returns of 3. Th e curves in Figure 8 for r = 
0 and r = 3, and column 3 in Table 4 clearly highlight that fact.
R (year)
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Th e models and their results have been summed up in Table 1. When there is no 
interest and everyone lives for the same length of time, the pension contribu-
tion rate will be 25 because everyone can only consume as much as they earned 
during their active years. When actual mortality and/or interests are taken into 
account, the contribution rate can go down, because actual savings are boosted 
from external sources. Th ese additional sources of money comprise the contribu-
tions of individuals who died before reaching retirement age, which are, in turn, 
contribute to the ﬁ nancing of the survivors’ pensions, and the compound inter-
ests of savings. Both resources are considerable, and even individually they can 
reduce pension contribution rates by almost a half, and they mutually reinforce 
each other.
Table 1
Pension contribution rate (s) in the various models
necessary to ensure a 100% replacement rate
R = 60 years Deterministic model Stochastic model
No interest 25.0% 15.3%
Interest, r = 3% 12.8% 6.7%
3. THE EFFECT OF THE “WOMEN 40” AND THE “MEN 40” 
PROGRAMMES ON THE EQUILIBRIUM REPLACEMENT RATE
It is assumed that a person will have reached the 40-year eligibility period at the 
age of 58, if that person started work at 18, his/her employment was never inter-
rupted, with the exception of maternity leave for women. Th e “Women 40” and 
“Men 40” programmes mean that in addition to 63-year-olds, anyone in the ﬁ ve 
age groups of 58–62-year-olds who meets these criteria is allowed to retire. Peo-
ple meeting the criteria constitute some 30 of the ﬁ ve age groups, which cor-
responds to current actual data for women. Let us assume furthermore that none 
of the people applying for retirement are unemployed or working in the grey or 
black markets.23
Th e diﬀ erences caused by the “Women 40” and “Men 40” programmes are marked 
with the variables ΔM and ΔW, for which the contribution rate is as follows:
B = WM × s × AM – WM × s × ΔM + WW × s × AW – WW × s × ΔW (27)
23  In Hungary it is unlikely that they will have acquired 40 years of eligibility before the age of 63.
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Th e volume of pension payments:
K = h × (1 – a –s) × (WM × NM + WM × ΔM + WW × NW + WW × ΔW) (28)
Th e two being equal, following quantiﬁ cation and considering that WN= 0.86×WW, 
it can be established that:
s × (AM + 0.86 × AW – ΔM – 0.86 × ΔW) = 
= h × (1– a – s) × (PM + 0.86 × PW + ΔM + 0.86 × ΔW) 
(29)
In the next step, rearranging equation (29) produces the following r replacement 
rate:
  (30)
Th e replacement rates and their comparison are summed up in Tables 2 and 3 
below.   
Table 2
Replacement rates depending on the “Women 40” and “Men 40” programmes,
with actual demographic data*
Women
40
Men
40 AW AM NW NM h h reduction
no no 2,901,081 2,856,755 1,251,707 776,413 95.0% 0.0%
yes no 2,778,755 2,856,755 1,374,033 776,413 88.1% 8.2%
no yes 2,901,081 2,715,151 1,251,707 918,017 85.9% 10.8%
yes yes 2,778,755 2,715,151 1,374,033 918,017 80.0% 18.0%
Note: *Th e reduction of h is expressed in  (s = 18.6)
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Table 3
Replacement rates depending on the “Women 40”
and “Men 40” programmes, with actual demographic data*
Women
40
Men
40 AW AM NW NM h
h
reduction
no no 2,175,811 2,142,566 1,251,707 776,413 95.0% 0.0%
yes no 2,053,485 2,142,566 1,374,033 776,413 87.5% 8.9%
no yes 2,175,811 2,000,963 1,251,707 918,017 85.1% 11.7%
yes yes 2,053,485 2,000,963 1,374,033 918,017 78.7% 19.4%
Note: *taking into consideration unemployment and the grey/black economy (s = 22.9)
When considering the demographic facts behind our ﬁ nding, it is easy to see that 
the considerable drop in replacement rates can be attributed to the fact that the 
beneﬁ ciaries of these programmes are the largest male and female age groups of 
1953–1957.
As regards a prognosis for the “Women 40” and “Men 40” programmes, it can 
be said that unfavourable demographic processes, unemployment and the grey 
and black economy have deteriorated the ﬁ nancial situation of Hungary’s pen-
sion system, which has been further impaired by the introduction of the “Women 
40” programme in 2011. It is not very far-fetched to assume that introduction of 
the “Men 40” programme would worsen this situation to the extent that – ceteris 
paribus – it would be necessary to cut pensions by over 19, that is, taking the 95 
replacement rate in out models down below 79. Th at would mean the answer to 
András Farkas’s question (“Should we help a hundred thousand by hurting two 
million?”) would be “yes”, and it should be noted furthermore that the a ﬁ ft h of 
the pension given to the hundred thousand would have to be soon taken away.
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